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Abstract: Making choices between payoffs available at different points in time reliably engages a deci-
sion-making brain circuit that includes medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), and ventral striatum (VS). Previous neuroimaging studies produced differing accounts of the
functions of these regions, including that these regions: (1) are sensitive to the value of rewards dis-
counted by a function of delay (’subjective value’); (2) are differentially sensitive to the availability of an
immediate reward; and (3) are implicated in impulsive decision-making. In this event-related fMRI study
of 20 volunteers, these hypotheses were investigated simultaneously using a delay discounting task in
which magnitude of rewards and stimulus type, i.e., the presence or absence of an immediate option,
were independently varied, and in which participants’ trait impulsivity was assessed with the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale. Results showed that mPFC, PCC, and VS are sensitive to the subjective value of
rewards, whereas mPFC and PCC, but not VS, are sensitive to the presence of an immediate reward in
the choice option. Moderation by individual differences in trait impulsivity was specific to the mPFC.
Conjunction analysis showed significant overlap in mPFC and PCC for the main effects of subjective
value and stimulus type, indicating these regions may serve multiple distinct roles during intertemporal
decision-making. These findings significantly advance our understanding of the specificity and overlap
of functions subserved by different regions involved in intertemporal decision-making, and help to rec-
oncile conflicting accounts in the literature. Hum Brain Mapp 32:1637–1648, 2011. VC 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.




People routinely make decisions that involve trading off
outcomes that occur at different points in time. Recent
neuroimaging studies have sought to clarify the neural
basis of intertemporal choice using the delay discounting
task [Myerson and Green, 1995]. In this task, participants
are presented with a series of binary choices between
smaller magnitude monetary rewards delivered with a
smaller delay and larger magnitude monetary rewards
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delivered with a larger delay. These neuroimaging studies
have converged on a common set of regions that are acti-
vated during the task, especially medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and ventral
regions of striatum (VS) [Ballard and Knutson, 2009; Kable
and Glimcher, 2007; Luhmann et al., 2008; McClure et al.,
2004, 2007; Peters and Buchel, 2009; Weber and Huettel,
2008], though the role these regions play in intertemporal
decision-making is still disputed.
Economic and behavioral theories posit that humans
value future rewards based not on their objective magni-
tude, but rather on their subjective value, which is derived
from the objective magnitude discounted by some function
of the delay imposed on receipt of the reward [Frederick
et al., 2002; Samuelson, 1937]. Recent neuroimaging studies
suggest that the subjective value of available rewards con-
tributes to activation in mPFC, PCC, and VS during inter-
temporal choice. Kable and Glimcher [2007] presented
participants with a choice between an immediate reward
fixed in magnitude and a delayed reward whose magnitude
and delay were parametrically varied. They found precise
fits between activation in mPFC, PCC, and VS and a regres-
sor that models the subjective value of the later reward.
However, in this design, the subjective value of the later
reward was perfectly collinear with the difference of the
subjective values of the two rewards, as well as the sum of
both values. However, if a design is used in which the mag-
nitude and delay of the earlier reward is also allowed to
vary, which perhaps is more representative of the kinds of
intertemporal choices people confront in real-world set-
tings, these functions of the subjective values of the two
available rewards are no longer collinear and can be distin-
guished. This raises the intriguing question of which subjec-
tive value function is represented in the brain.
A second factor that may account for patterns of activa-
tion in mPFC, PCC, and VS during intertemporal choice is
stimulus type, in particular the presence or absence of an
option to receive an immediate reward. According to the
‘two systems model’ from McClure et al. [2007, 2004], sep-
arate neural systems value rewards available at different
points in time. One system located primarily in ventral
and dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex and superior parietal
regions values rewards available at all points in time irre-
spective of delay. A second valuation system, which
includes mPFC, PCC, and VS, is specialized for represent-
ing the value of immediate rewards. Consistent with this
hypothesis, they demonstrated [McClure et al., 2004, 2007]
that mPFC, PCC, and VS are significantly more active dur-
ing choices in which an immediate option is available
compared with choices where both options are delayed.
However, controversy remains about whether enhanced
activation in mPFC, PCC, and VS during trials with an im-
mediate option arises only because immediate options are
more subjectively valuable [Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Kable and Glimcher, 2010], or rather because these regions
genuinely exhibit specificity for the availability of immedi-
ate rewards [McClure et al., 2004, 2007].
A third factor that may influence brain activation during
intertemporal decision-making is subjects’ level of trait
impulsivity. Previous studies have demonstrated that
one’s ability to delay gratification is a relatively stable psy-
chological trait, and this ability is predictive of a host of
future positive life outcomes, including academic, psycho-
logical and interpersonal outcomes [Duckworth and Selig-
man, 2005; Mischel et al., 1988; Tangney et al., 2004].
Behavioral studies have demonstrated that individuals
with higher levels of trait impulsivity [Richards et al.,
1999], or patient groups hypothesized to exhibit greater
trait impulsivity [Kirby et al., 1999; Solanto et al., 2001;
Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998], tend to discount future
outcomes more steeply. Previous fMRI studies of delay
discounting tasks have investigated neural correlates of
impulsivity during delay discounting using subjects’ own
choices during the fMRI task as the index of impulsiveness
[Ballard and Knutson, 2009; Luhmann et al., 2008]. How-
ever, the neural correlates of trait impulsivity during delay
discounting, as indexed by a scale validated to measure
this construct, have not yet been directly explored.
In this study, we investigated the contributions of sub-
jective value, stimulus type (i.e., the presence of an option
for an immediate reward), and trait impulsivity to patterns
of brain activation during delay discounting. We utilized a
delay discounting task in which the magnitude of rewards
and the presence or absence of an immediate option are
independently varied. In addition, we assessed all partici-
pants with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale [Patton et al.,
1995] and conducted an exploratory analysis of patterns of
brain activation during delay discounting that are associ-
ated with stable individual differences in impulsivity.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty right-handed males (all adults, mean age 28.7 
11.4 years) participated. All were healthy, not taking medi-
cations, and had no contraindications to participating in
an fMRI experiment. Informed consent was obtained using
a form approved by the Institutional Review Board of the
University of Michigan Medical School.
Task
The protocol for our delay discounting task was adapted
from McClure et al. [2004]. Participants were told that they
were involved in a study that assesses how people decide
between monetary rewards that are delivered with differ-
ent amounts of delay. Task instructions were reviewed
with each participant until clear understanding was
voiced. Participants were also told that at the end of the
scanning session, two trials would be picked at random
and participants would be paid the amounts, with the
delays, they had chosen in these trials in the form of Ama-
zon.com gift certificates delivered by email. Participants
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were explicitly instructed that given this payment scheme,
they should treat each trial as if it were one that would
actually be paid, and that each trial is equally likely to be
selected.
All participants received the same semirandom sequence
of trials where this sequence was generated by specifying
values for the four parameters listed below. Values for
these parameters were drawn from the following sets.
Time of earlier reward ¼ {today, 2 weeks, 4 weeks}
Time of later reward ¼ time of earlier reward þ {2
weeks, 4 weeks}
Magnitude of earlier reward ¼ value randomly drawn
from {Guassian distribution with mean $20 and s.d. $10}
Magnitude of later reward ¼ magnitude of earlier reward
þ {1%, 10%, 25%, 50%} of magnitude of earlier reward
Each trial proceeded as follows (see Fig. 1). The two
options were presented on the left and right sides of the
screen with the earlier option always presented on the left.
Two yellow triangles were situated below each dollar
amount indicating that participants could make their
choice by button box (mounted to their right hand). Partic-
ipants were then allowed as much time as needed to make
their selection. Once the response was made, the corre-
sponding yellow triangle turned red for 2 s indicating that
the response had been recorded. The screen then dis-
played a fixation cross for 12 s, followed by the next trial.
Participants performed 80 trials over four runs.
In the ‘‘Immediacy Present" condition (32 trials), one
option was an immediate reward and the other a delayed
reward. In the ‘‘Immediacy Absent" condition (48 trials),
both options were delayed. Of note, subjects also com-
pleted an attention task during this scanner session that is
not related to the topic of this report.
Neuroimaging
MRI scanning occurred on a General Electric (Waukesha,
WI) 3T Signa scanner [LX (8.3) release, neurooptimized gra-
dients]. Scanning began with structural acquisition of a
standard T1 image (T1-overlay) for anatomic normalization
and alignment. We used a T2*-weighted, reverse spiral ac-
quisition sequence [GRE; repetition time, 2,000 ms; echo
time, 30 ms; flip angle, 90; field of view (FOV), 20 cm; 40
slice; thickness/skip, 3.0/0 mm matrix size equivalent to 64
 64], which has been shown [Glover and Law, 2001] to
minimize signal drop-out in regions such as ventral stria-
tum and orbitofrontal cortex that are vulnerable to suscepti-
bility artifact. After discarding four initial volumes to
permit thermal equilibration of the MRI signal, 200 volumes
were acquired per run. After acquisition of functional vol-
umes, a high-resolution T1 scan was obtained for anatomic
normalization [three-dimensional spoiled gradient-recalled
acquisition in a steady state (SPGR); 24 FOV; thickness/
skip, 1.0/0 mm]. Stimuli were presented and responses
recorded using a computer running E-prime (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), interfaced to project stim-
uli onto MR-compatible liquid crystal display goggles (Res-
onance Technology, Northridge, CA). Choices were made
using an MRI-compatible button box.
Neuroimaging Analysis
Data from all 20 participants met criteria for high qual-
ity (uniformity and homogeneity of T2* images in regions
such as ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex prone to
susceptibility artifact) and scan stability (motion correc-
tion <2 mm displacement), and were subsequently
included in the data processing. Preprocessing steps were
implemented using Statistical Parametric Mapping 2 soft-
ware (SPM2; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurol-
ogy, London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing
followed conventional procedures: (1) slice time correc-
tion; (2) spatial realignment; (3) normalization to the
structural (T1-weighted) Montreal Neurologic Institute
(MNI) template through the use of a nonlinear warping
algorithm followed by resampling by sync interpolation
resulting in a voxel size of 3  3  3 mm3; (4) spatial
smoothing through the use of a Gaussian 5 mm full-with-
half-maximum kernel; (5) high-pass temporal filtering
with a cut-off of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts in
signal. After preprocessing, statistical analyses were per-
formed at the individual and group level using the gen-
eral linear model (GLM) and Gaussian random field
theory as implemented in SPM2.
For the individual level analyses, four regressors were
entered into the GLM to model subjective value of
rewards, stimulus type (i.e., Immediacy Present or
Figure 1.
Schematic diagram of task. During fMRI scanning, 20 healthy vol-
unteers made choices (n ¼ 80) between smaller earlier rewards
and larger later rewards. [Color figure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Immediacy Absent), the interaction between subjective
value and stimulus type, and reaction time. To model the
effect of subjective value, we first constructed a number of
different candidate subjective value regressors. To con-
struct these regressors, we computed the subjective value
of each reward present in each trial. We estimated dis-
counting rates for each subject using that subject’s own
expressed choices during the 80 trials of this experiment
using a generalized linear mixed model, with a logit link
function and subject as a random effect factor. We
assumed an exponential discounting function: SV ¼ dtA,
where d is the discount rate, t is time, and A is the dollar
amount of the reward. Each subject’s discounting rate was
then used to determine a subjective value for each reward
in each trial. On the basis of previous literature and our
own a priori hypotheses, we tested candidate subjective
value regressors that encoded (1) the larger subjective
value of the two available rewards; (2) the sum of the sub-
jective values; and (3) the difference of the later minus the
earlier subjective values. Each candidate subjective value
regressor was tested separately as part of a four regressor
model that also included stimulus type, stimulus type 
subjective value interaction, and reaction time. In a sepa-
rate analysis, we assumed a hyperbolic form for the dis-
counting function [SV ¼ A*(1/hþ1)t]. Since the assumption
of a hyperbolic discounting function produced subjective
value estimates that were highly similar to the exponential
discounting function (correlation between the exponential
and hyperbolic difference of subjective value regressors
was 0.992), we retained the subjective value regressors
generated by the exponential function to maximize com-
patibility of our findings with a previous study using a
similar paradigm [McClure et al., 2004] that also assumed
an exponential form for the discounting function.
The interaction term in our GLM was derived by multi-
plying the mean-centered stimulus type and subjective
value regressors. To control for the possible influence of
statistically significant differences in response time across
different trial types, two strategies were used. First, based
on prior studies that identify a four second window of de-
cision-related activation post-stimulus presentation [Kable
and Glimcher, 2007], we used a four second trial duration
that began when the binary choice option was first pre-
sented to the participants, and also included a regressor
modeling reaction time in the first-level GLM. The second
strategy involved using a variable decision-making inter-
val defined for each trial that began when the binary
choice option was first presented to the participant and
terminated when the participant indicated his or her
choice by push-button. Both methods yielded nearly iden-
tical results and did not impact findings of the current
study. Thus we report the results from the first method to
maintain continuity with existing studies.
For all group analyses, subjects were treated as a ran-
dom effect. Images were thresholded by using a voxel-
wise threshold of P < 0.005, combined with a cluster size
threshold of 32 contiguous voxels (864 mm3). This com-
bined threshold was estimated with a Monte Carlo simula-
tion using AlphaSim (Douglas Ward, http://afni.nimh.
nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/program_help/AlphaSim.html) to
give an overall threshold of P < 0.05, corrected for multi-
ple comparisons across the entire brain. Whole brain,
voxel-wise multiple regression analysis of group-level
maps, as implemented in SPM2, was used to identify brain
regions whose activations correlated with scores on the
Barratt Impulsivity Scale, and are displayed at the Alpha-
Sim-derived threshold mentioned previously. To identify
brain regions that are sensitive both to the effects of subjec-
tive value as well as stimulus type, we conducted a con-
junction analysis [Nichols et al., 2005]. Group-level whole
brain maps of regions sensitive to subjective value and
stimulus type were thresholded at P < 0.005 and binarized.
These maps were then summed to create a conjunction map
reflecting regions of common activation in both maps, and
all regions larger than five voxels (135 mm3) are displayed.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Behavioral results showed that participants chose the
earlier of the two rewards (across all trial types) on 46.4%
of trials, choosing the immediate reward in 48.3% of Im-
mediacy Present trials and the smaller delay reward in
45.1% of Immediacy Absent trials—a difference that was
not statistically significant. Subjects’ choices were well
characterized by an exponential discounting function. We
use the fixed effect exponential discounting model (i.e., ev-
ery subject has the same discounting parameter, which
was estimated at 0.956) as the baseline model. The baseline
model yielded an accuracy of 79% correct predictions
across all subjects and items. The full model that allows
heterogeneity in the subjects’ discount parameter using a
random effect model yielded an accuracy of 87% correct
predictions. The pseudo R2 for the improvement of the
heterogeneous model error variance over the baseline
model is 34%, which means that allowing for heterogene-
ity of discount parameters reduced the error variance by
34% (likelihood ratio test comparing the full and baseline
models (X2(1) ¼ 577.9, P < 0.0001). The average rate of
discounting was 0.9493, which means payoffs lost roughly
5% of their value per week of delay. Rates of discounting
ranged from 0.8094 for our most impulsive subject to 0.9865
for our least impulsive subject. Barratt scores (mean: 57.00
 5.60) were correlated with choice of the earlier reward in
both Immediacy Present trials (r ¼ 0.43, P ¼ 0.059) as well
as Immediacy Absent trials (r ¼ 0.56, P ¼ 0.011). Barratt
scores also correlated with subjects’ exponential discount-
ing rates (r ¼ 0.54, P ¼ 0.014). Mean response time for all
trials was 3.07 s  0.60 s. Reaction time was significantly
longer for Immediacy Absent trials (3.26 s  0.70 s) com-
pared with Immediacy Present trials (2.77 s  0.51; paired
T(19) ¼ 6.84, P < 0.001), and we discuss the significance of
this finding in the discussion section.
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Neuroimaging Results
Main effect of subjective value
In whole brain voxel-wise analysis, we tested associa-
tions between brain activation and the three candidate
subjective value regressors (each regressor was tested in a
separate whole brain analysis). Regressors encoding the
larger subjective value of the two available rewards
(mean, 18.75; range, 1.77–47.94) and the sum of the subjec-
tive values of two available rewards (mean, 34.89; range,
1.77–46.94) were not found to significantly correlate either
positively or negatively with any brain regions. However,
the regressor encoding the difference in the subjective val-
ues of the two available rewards (the ‘‘DiffSV" regressor;
mean 0.65, range 18.09 to þ11.22) positively correlated
with activation in a number of regions including mPFC,
PCC (and large regions of adjacent precuneus), VS, as well
as dorsal striatum, amygdala, and medial temporal regions
(Fig. 2, Table I). No brain regions were found to be nega-
tively correlated with the DiffSV regressor.
Of note, as would be expected, DiffSV is highly posi-
tively correlated with subjects’ choices for delayed rewards
because when the difference in subjective value between
the later versus earlier reward is large, subjects are more
likely to choose the later reward. We performed an addi-
tional analysis in which a regressor encoding subjects’
choices was entered into the GLM in place of the DiffSV
regressor. In whole brain search for regions more active
during choices for later rewards compared to earlier
rewards, we observed activation in mPFC, PCC, and VS,
as well as thalamus and medial temporal regions (Table I).
For the purposes of the remaining analyses, we retained
the DiffSV regressor in our General Linear Model, and we
discuss the fact that it is not possible in the current study
to dissociate contributions of DiffSV from contributions of
subjects’ choices in the discussion section.
Main effect of stimulus type
We next conducted a whole brain voxel-wise search for
brain regions sensitive to the main effect of stimulus type.
We observed greater activation in Immediacy Present trials
versus Immediacy Absent trials in mPFC, PCC/mid-cingu-
late cortex, precuneus/retrosplenial cortex, and left infe-
rior parietal cortex (Fig. 3A, Table I). In addition,
activations were observed in regions of middle temporal
gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus (Table I). We
observed greater activation in Immediacy Absent trials
compared to Immediacy Present trials in a diverse net-
work including bilateral superior parietal cortex, right dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, and supplementary motor
cortex extending to the border of dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (Fig. 3B, Table I). Overall, these results are consist-
ent with two previous studies by McClure and colleagues
[McClure et al., 2004, 2007], who found similar regions
activated in contrasts that are comparable to those
employed in this study.
Conjunction analyses
The group-level whole brain maps derived from the pre-
vious analyses provided evidence that a number of regions
including mPFC and PCC are sensitive to subjective value
as well as stimulus type (i.e., Immediacy Present > Imme-
diacy Absent condition). We performed a conjunction anal-
ysis of these group-level whole brain maps to identify
brain regions that are sensitive to both of these effects. A
Figure 2.
Main effect of subjective value. Activation in medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex,
and ventral and dorsal striatum is significantly and selectively correlated with a regressor that
encodes the difference in the subjective value of the later minus the earlier of two available
rewards. All activations are displayed at whole brain voxel-wise Pcorrected < 0.05. [Color figure
can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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TABLE I. Activation results from whole brain voxel-wise analysis




(x, y, z) Analysis z
Difference of subjective value of later minus earlier reward (‘Diffsv’)
Precuneus/Posterior Cingulate 12,852 15, 48, 42 4.59
Middle frontal gyrus 3,807 24, 63, 24 4.44
Lingual gyrus 1,539 0, 66, 9 4.34
Hippocampus/Amygdala 4,293 12, 6, 18 4.21
Cuneus 1,782 6, 90, 30 4.16
Medial orbital frontal gyrus 3,240 9, 30, 3 4.02
Middle frontal gyrus 4,563 24, 42, 39 3.93
Hippocampus 5,238 15, 39, 12 3.89
Postcentral gyrus 1,728 42, 27, 57 3.86
Putamen/Ventral striatum 1,053 24, 9, 6 3.73
Putamen/Ventral striatum ,891 27, 15, 3 3.68
Inferior parietal lobule 2,916 60, 48, 42 3.63
Angular gyrus 1,377 42, 63, 42 3.59
Cerebellum 1,323 33, 78, 21 3.56
Caudate ,918 21, 12, 21 3.51
Medial orbital frontal gyrus 1,728 3, 54, 3 3.45
Cerebellum 1,107 18, 45, 24 3.45
Middle temporal gyrus 3,186 60, 24, 3 3.34
Angular gyrus 1,188 54, 60, 36 3.31
Insula ,999 39, 6, 6 3.25
Choose Later > Choose Earlier
Superior occipital gyrus 3,915 12, 90, 18 4.68
Thalamus 1,242 21, 12, 24 4.24
Putamen 1,080 18, 15, 6 4.2
Parahippocampal gyrus/Hippocampus ,972 21, 27, 18 3.93
Middle frontal gyrus ,945 42, 48, 12 3.92
Middle cingulate gyrus 2,349 9, 24, 45 3.87
Lingual gyrus 1,728 15, 48, 0 3.79
Medial superior frontal gyrus 3,753 12, 57, 3 3.79
Cerebellum 1,728 21, 45, 21 3.74
Rolandic operculum 1,323 57, 18, 12 3.71
Parahippocampal gyrus ,864 18, 27, 18 3.68
Superior temporal lobe 1,080 60, 24, 0 3.58
Cuneus 1,026 24, 75, 21 3.58
Angular gyrus ,945 48, 69, 51 3.52
Cuneus ,891 3, 72, 30 3.35
Immediacy Present > Immediacy Absent
Medial superior frontal gyrus 5,265 9, 66, 12 5.14
Angular gyrus 3,618 57, 69, 42 4.6
Medial superior frontal gyrus 1,458 6, 57, 33 4.21
Superior frontal gyrus 1,593 9, 36, 51 4.16
Middle cingulate gyrus 1,377 9, 45, 36 3.92
Precuneus/Posterior cingulate 2,214 6, 54, 12 3.9
Immediacy Absent > Immediacy Present
Middle occipital gyrus/Superior parietal lobule 9,720 27, 75, 39 5.74
Precental gyrus 2,511 60, 15, 24 4.49
Calcarine cortex 4,401 18, 105, 3 4.37
Superior parietal lobule 8,559 33, 75, 33 4.12
Supplementary motor area 3,888 6, 9, 54 4.12
Middle frontal gyrus (Dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex) ,945 39, 45, 36 3.92
Middle frontal gyrus 1,755 30, 3, 69 3.67
Immediacy Present > Immediacy Absent,
Inverse Correlation With Barratt Scores
Middle occipital gyrus/Cuneus 1,890 30, 75, 21 4.01
Parahippocampal gyrus 1,350 27, 39, 9 4.24
Superior medial frontal gyrus (Anterior mPFC) 1,242 6, 54, 15 3.34
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conjunction analysis of the map of regions correlated with
the DiffSV regressor and the map of regions more active
in Immediacy Present trials (>Immediacy Absent trials)
revealed common areas of activation in mPFC, PCC, and
precuneus (Fig. 4, Table I). The analogous conjunction
analysis for Immediacy Absent trials (>Immediacy Present
trials) revealed no areas of overlap.
Given the significantly longer mean reaction times in the
Immediacy Absent versus Immediacy Present condition,
we performed additional conjunction analyses to identify
whether reaction time might contribute to activation differ-
ences in the Immediacy Present (>Immediacy Absent) and
Immediacy Absent (>Immediacy Present) conditions. We
generated maps of regions whose activation is correlated
with reaction time for Immediacy Present trials and Imme-
diacy Absent trials separately. Conjunction analysis
revealed no overlap between regions observed in the con-
trast of Immediacy Present (>Immediacy Absent) trials
and regions correlated either positively or negatively with
reaction time. However, we did observe overlap between
regions more active in Immediacy Absent (>Immediacy
Present) trials and regions positively correlated with reac-
tion time in supplementary motor area and bilateral supe-
rior parietal cortex (Table I).
TABLE I. (Continued)




(x, y, z) Analysis z
Conjunction analyses: (Immediacy present >
Immediacy absent) AND (DiffSV)
Medial superior frontal gyrus ,891 6, 54, 12
Precuneus ,351 6, 66, 15
Posterior cingulate ,351 9, 39, 30
(Immediacy Present > Immediacy Absent) and
(Regions positively correlated with RT in
Immediacy Present trials)
Supplementary motor area 2,457 3, 15, 51
Superior parietal lobule ,756 24, 63, 51
(Immediacy present > Immediacy absent) and
(Regions positively correlated with RT in
immediacy absent trials)
Supplementary motor area 2,754 0, 12, 51
Superior parietal lobule 1,323 30, 60, 51
Superior parietal lobule ,648 27, 69, 48
Figure 3.
Main effect of stimulus type. A: Enhanced activation in medial pre-
frontal cortex, posterior/mid-cingulate cortex, precuneus/retrosple-
nial cortex in trials in which one option is immediate compared to
trials in which both options are delayed. B: In the opposite contrast,
a distinct network of brain regions including right dorsal lateral pre-
frontal cortex, supplementary motor cortex, and right superior pa-
rietal cortex is observed. All activations are displayed at whole brain
voxel-wise Pcorrected < 0.05. [Color figure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Stimulus type 3 DiffSV interaction
The Stimulus type  DiffSV interaction term identifies
brain regions whose activation is significantly more corre-
lated with the DiffSV regressor in one stimulus condition
versus the other. Whole brain voxel-wise search revealed
no brain regions that exhibited a significant positive or
negative interaction.
Individual-differences in trait impulsivity
In whole brain, voxel-wise multiple regression analysis,
we correlated participants’ Barratt scores (higher scores ¼
greater impulsivity) with activation maps derived from the
main effects identified above. In the map of brain regions
sensitive to the availability of immediate rewards (Imme-
diacy Present > Immediacy Absent), we observed a signif-
icant cluster in anterior mPFC for which activation was
inversely correlated with Barratt scores (MNI coordinates:
[6, 54, 15]; 1242 mm3) (Fig. 5; Table I), indicating that more
impulsive individuals had less activation in this region in
trials with an immediate option present compared to trials
in which an immediate option is absent. Of note, no brain
regions were positively correlated with Barratt scores.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we examined contributions of subjective
value, stimulus type, and trait impulsivity to brain activity
during a delay discounting task in which participants
made choices between smaller, earlier rewards and larger,
later rewards. Our primary result is that (1) mPFC, PCC,
and VS, three regions reliably activated in prior studies of
delay discounting, are sensitive to the subjective value of
rewards (in particular, the difference in subjective value of
later minus earlier reward); and (2) mPFC and PCC are
sensitive to the presence of an immediate reward in the
choice option. Individual-differences in trait impulsivity
(as expressed in Barratt scores) moderated the reactivity of
mPFC during the contrast of trials in which one option is
immediate against trials in which both options are
delayed. These findings substantially nuance our under-
standing of the function of brain regions involved in inter-
temporal choice and suggest intriguing hypotheses about
the brain basis of trait impulsivity.
Activation in mPFC, PCC, and VS were found to
robustly correlate with the difference in subjective value of
the later minus earlier reward (‘‘DiffSV’’), but not to the
sum or the larger subjective value of the two available
rewards. A prior fMRI study of delay discounting by
Kable and Glimcher [2007] found evidence for representa-
tions of subjective value of rewards in these same regions,
but, due to differences in design, they could not distin-
guish between the hypothesis that these regions represent
the subjective value of the later of the two rewards, their
sum, or their difference. Our results suggest it is the differ-
ence in subjective value of the later minus earlier reward
that is represented, rather than these alternatives. One li-
mitation of this study is that since DiffSV will naturally be
highly collinear with choice for the later reward, we could
not rule out the competing hypothesis that mPFC, PCC,
and VS activation is driven by making a choice for the
later reward itself. Of note, other studies that have used
designs better suited for disentangling subjective value
from choice [Chib et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009; Montague
et al., 2006; O’Doherty et al., 2006], have found activation
in mPFC and VS is associated with subjective value of
rewards, providing some evidence in favor of the view
that these regions are indeed involved in representation of
subjective value rather than the choice itself.
We found trials in which an immediate option was avail-
able, compared to trials in which both options were delayed,
activated multiple regions including mPFC, PCC, precuneus,
and medial temporal regions, and several hypotheses are
available to explain this enhanced activation. One hypothesis
explains this enhanced activation in terms of the greater sub-
jective value of immediate rewards, i.e., ‘the special prefer-
ence for immediacy’, which behavioral studies have reliably
detected [Frederick et al., 2002; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995].
However, arguing against this hypothesis, we did not find
Figure 4.
Conjunction analysis of effects of subjective value and stimulus
type. Whole brain group-level maps of regions responsive to the
main effect of subjective value (i.e., activation is correlated with
the difference in subjective value of the two rewards) and stimulus
type (i.e., greater activation for trials with an immediate reward
available) were generated from a general linear model that mod-
eled the effects of subjective value, stimulus type, and their inter-
action. A conjunction analysis of these whole brain maps revealed
that medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and pre-
cuneus, regions reliably activated in prior fMRI studies of delay dis-
counting (see Introduction), are independently sensitive to both
subjective value and stimulus type. [Color figure can be viewed in
the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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behavioral evidence for a special preference for immediacy in
this study. Subjects tended to choose the immediate reward
in Immediacy Present trials and the earlier reward in Imme-
diacy Absent trials with roughly equal frequency. Further-
more, subjective values (in particular DiffSV values)
calculated by assuming an exponential versus hyperbolic
form for the discounting function (where the latter, but not
the former, can capture the special preference for immediacy)
were nearly identical (r ¼ 0.992), showing again that subjects
tended not to overvalue immediate options. The absence of
an immediacy effect in this study may arise from a combina-
tion of factors including the relatively low dollar amounts
and narrow range of delays used, as well as the use of Ama-
zon.com gift certificates for payment whose utilization is asso-
ciated with inherent delays. An alternative hypothesis that
might explain the enhanced activation of multiple brain
regions during Immediacy Present (>Immediacy Absent) tri-
als involves cognitive load. Previous studies have found a net-
work of midline and lateral parietal regions, including mPFC
and PCC, are reliably more active during rest periods
between blocks of cognitively demanding tasks, and also
more active in less cognitively demanding tasks contrasted
with more demanding tasks [Mazoyer et al., 2001; McKiernan
et al., 2003; Raichle et al., 2001]. Immediacy Present trials may
be less cognitively demanding than Immediacy Absent trials
as evidenced by the fact that reaction time, often used as an
indirect measure of cognitive load, is significantly shorter in
Immediacy Present trials. However, we also found that
regions more active in Immediacy Present (>Immediacy
Absent) trials did not overlap with regions whose activation
is inversely correlated with reaction time, providing some evi-
dence against the cognitive load hypothesis. Other explana-
tions for enhanced activation in mPFC and PCC during
Immediacy Present trials are also available, and we discuss
these in the context of McClure and colleagues’ two systems
model below.
Whole brain conjunction analysis revealed there was sig-
nificant overlap between the regions that were sensitive to
the availability of immediate rewards and the regions
found to represent DiffSV (see Fig. 4) in mPFC, PCC, and
precuneus. The fact that some of the same regions in mPFC
and PCC are independently sensitive to both subjective
value and stimulus type sheds new light on an important
controversy in the recent literature. McClure and colleagues
have proposed a ‘two systems’ model [McClure et al., 2004,
2007; Sanfey et al., 2006] in which mPFC, PCC, and VS con-
stitute a valuation system specialized for representing the
subjective value of immediate rewards. In contrast, Kable
and Glimcher [2007] have proposed a ‘one system’ model
in which mPFC, PCC, and VS represent the subjective value
of rewards at all points in time. Consistent with Kable and
Glimcher, our data support the view that mPFC, PCC, and
VS represent the subjective value of rewards at all points in
time (in particular they represent the difference in subjec-
tive value of the later minus earlier reward). But in agree-
ment with McClure and colleagues, we found two of these
regions, in particular mPFC and PCC, are also sensitive to
the presence of immediate rewards.
It is useful to discuss our results in light of McClure
and colleagues’ two system model in greater detail.
McClure et al. hypothesize that mPFC, PCC, and VS are
part of a valuation system specialized for responding to
immediate rewards and that biases choice towards the im-
mediate option. In contrast, we found regions that are
more active when an immediate reward is available did
not predict choices for more immediate rewards. Rather,
consistent with the role of mPFC and PCC in representing
DiffSV, we found these regions are more active during
Figure 5.
Anterior medial prefrontal cortex and Barratt scores. A: In the
whole brain map of regions sensitive to the main effect of stimu-
lus type (i.e., greater activation for trials in which one option is
immediate versus trials in which both options are delayed),
voxel-wise multiple regression analysis revealed activation in an-
terior medial prefrontal cortex is inversely correlated with Bar-
ratt scores. All activations are displayed at whole brain voxel-
wise Pcorrected < 0.05. B: Scatter plot showing distribution of
Barratt scores and BOLD responses in this anterior medial pre-
frontal cortex region. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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choices for more delayed rewards, which is in agreement
with other studies that also report higher activation in
these regions predicts choices for later rewards [Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Buchel, 2009; Weber and Huet-
tel, 2008]. The two systems model also holds that a second
valuation system, which includes dorsal lateral prefrontal
cortex and superior parietal cortex, represents rewards at
all points in time and biases choices for more delayed
rewards. McClure and colleagues propose that these regions
implement high-level executive functions including delibera-
tive reasoning [Krawczyk, 2002; Smith and Jonides, 1999],
and numerical computation [Dehaene et al., 1998; Fias et al.,
2003], which are needed to represent rewards available at
differing points in time, as they are more abstract and intan-
gible than immediate rewards [McClure et al., 2004; Sanfey
et al., 2006]. However, we found dorsal lateral prefrontal
cortex and superior parietal cortex are not equally active
across all trial types (as McClure et al. propose) but rather
are significantly more active during trials in which both
rewards are delayed compared to trials in which one
reward is immediate. A third region, supplementary motor
cortex, which has been implicated in prior studies of deci-
sion-making [Ridderinkhof et al., 2004], especially with
uncertain choices involving probability and risk [Volz et al.,
2003, 2004], was also more active in Immediacy Absent
(>Immediacy Present) trials. Moreover activation in superior
parietal cortex and supplementary motor cortex was found
to significantly overlap with regions whose activation posi-
tively correlated with reaction time, providing additional
evidence that these regions are involved in high cognitive
load processing. Our finding of enhanced activation in mul-
tiple executive processing regions in Immediacy Absent tri-
als (>Immediacy Present trials) is not necessarily
inconsistent with McClure et al.’s two systems model, and
may be perhaps explained if representing two abstract, in-
tangible delayed rewards places greater demands on execu-
tive and numerical processing than representing just one
delayed reward. However, we did not find that any of the
regions that were more active during Immediacy Absent
(>Immediacy Present) trials predicted choices for more
delayed rewards (Table I). Thus while our results support
McClure et al.’s view that regions that support executive
processing and numerical cognition are engaged during
intertemporal choice, we did not find evidence that these
regions constitute a valuation system that biases choices for
more delayed rewards.
In whole brain multiple regression analysis, we found
that activation in mPFC was inversely correlated with Bar-
ratt scores, a measure of trait impulsivity, in the contrast
of Immediacy Present trials and Immediacy Absent trials.
Another recent study of delay discounting [Luhmann
et al., 2008] found a similar inverse correlation between a
measure of participants’ preference for immediacy
(derived from participants’ choice-behavior during the de-
cision-making task) and activity in a similar anterior
mPFC region. These findings of anterior mPFC hypoacti-
vation in more impulsive individuals are intriguing in
light of a number of recent proposals that anterior mPFC
serves as an executive/regulatory region that plays a high-
level role in coordinating and integrating competing cogni-
tive operations [Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Burgess et al.,
2007a,b; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Gilbert et al., 2006;
Ramnani and Owen, 2004]. Consistent with this view,
other decision-making studies have found activation in an-
terior mPFC during conflicted choice. For example, Moll
et al. [2006] studied a social donation game that pits perso-
nal selfish interest against social benefits, and found ante-
rior mPFC activation specifically in trials in which social
benefit was chosen over selfish interest (see also de Quer-
vain et al. [2004] for a similar finding). More recently, an-
terior mPFC activation has been detected in a novel
decision-making study in which opportunities for immedi-
ate payoffs compete with chances to secure larger later
payoffs [Diekhof and Gruber, 2010]. Of note, previous
studies have linked impulsivity with alterations in VS
reward-related responsivity. For example, VS activity dur-
ing a monetary rewards task has been found to correlate
with temporal discounting rates [Hariri et al., 2006] as
well as Barratt Impulsivity Scale scores [Forbes et al.,
2009]. A key difference between these studies and the
present one is that we measured brain activity during the
decision phase of a delay discounting task in which feed-
back was absent, while these previous studies measured
brain activity collapsing across the decision and feedback
phases of a guessing game task in which subjects received
stochastic positive and negative feedback. Thus this study
highlights a link between anterior mPFC and trait impul-
sivity specifically during reward-related decision-making,
consistent with a number of prior studies that activate an-
terior mPFC during decision-making, and especially dur-
ing conflicted choice [de Quervain et al., 2004; Diekhof
and Gruber, 2010; Moll et al., 2006]. Future studies should
directly investigate whether trait impulsivity is linked to
alterations in distinct brain regions (anterior mPFC versus
VS) during distinct phases (decision-phase versus out-
come-phase) of reward-related tasks.
In sum, we examined contributions of subjective value,
stimulus type, and trait impulsivity to brain activity with
fMRI and a delay discounting task. We found that mPFC,
PCC, and VS, three regions reliably activated in prior stud-
ies of delay discounting, are sensitive to subjective value,
mPFC and PCC are sensitive to stimulus type (i.e., the
presence of an immediate option), and that trait impulsiv-
ity moderated activity in mPFC. These findings signifi-
cantly advance our understanding of the specificity and
overlap of functions subserved by different regions
involved in intertemporal decision-making, and raise new
hypotheses about the brain basis of impulsivity.
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